Määratlemata õigusmõiste tõlgendamise ja õiguslünga ületamise semiootiline mudel

Väitekirja elektrooniline versioon sisaldab osaliselt publikatsiooneDoktoritöö eesmärk on avardada õigusteoreetilist nägemisulatust: integreerida määratlemata õigusmõistete tõlgendamise ja õiguslünga ületamise semiootiline mudel õigusteaduse meetodiõpetusse. Valitud on interdistsiplinaarne lähenemine. Õigussemiootika abil saab mudeldada õiguslikke protsesse tähendustekke aspektist, mis omakorda hõlbustab õigusteooria põhiküsimustele vastamist, nt kuidas leida õigusnormi tähendus. Doktoritöös on leitud, et määratlemata õigusmõiste tähenduse määravad kaks märgi omadust: direktiivsus ja binaarsus. Nendesamade märgi omaduste abil luuakse ka tähendus õiguslünga kohale õiguskorras. Järeldused, mis õiguse tõlgendamise kohta teha saab, on: esiteks, see, et normi ja lünga tõlgendamise semiootilise struktuuri sarnasus ilmneb kõige selgemalt määratlemata õigusmõistete näitel. Teiseks, sidusa modelleeriva süsteemina on õiguskorral võime genereerida lünga kohale sobiv lahendus, sest sõnade üksiktähenduste summa on suurem kui iga sõna tähendus ja aktiivseks muutub kogu õiguslik kood. Kolmandaks, iga õigusmõiste nagu ka iga õiguslünk oma kontekstis on ühelt poolt seotud õigussisese ja teisalt õigusvälise tähendusväljaga. Õiguse eneseleviitelisuse ja välisviitelisuse pingeseisund ehk binaarsus on nähtav määratlemata õigusmõistete tõlgendamisel nii Eesti kui ka Euroopa kohtupraktikas.The aim of this an interdisciplinary approach was chosen to expand the outlook of legal theory: the integration of a semiotic model for the interpretation of undefined legal concepts and filling legal gaps into the methodology of law. Legal semiotics allows modelling legal processes from the perspective of meaning-making, which in turn facilitates answering fundamental questions of legal theory, e.g. identifying the meaning of a legal norm. Directivity and binarity are the two semiotic properties of the legal norm as a sign that determine the formation of meaning. These semiotic properties also play a role in the formation of meaning in a place of legal gap. The principles of binarism and directivity allow us to draw the following conclusions about the interpretation of law. Firstly, the methodological similarity of the interpretation of the norm and the gap is the most apparent in the case of undefined legal concepts. Secondly, the legal system as a cohesive modelling system has the ability to generate a suitable solution in place of a gap, as the sum total of the meanings of individual words is greater than the meaning of each word by itself and the entire legal code becomes activated. Mechanisms imparting meaning to the gap in the legal system as a whole can be divided into three types: the iconic, indexical, and symbolic sign relationship, known in jurisprudence as analogy, teleological interpretation, and value judgement. Thirdly, every legal concept, but also every legal gap in its context is, on one hand, a reflection of the legal system and on the other hand, a reflection of the society. The tension between the two – self-reference and external reference of law – , their binarism, is perceptible in the interpretation of undefined legal concepts in both Estonian and European case-law, proving that it is necessary to consider both sides.https://www.ester.ee/record=b522779

Interpretation of Undefined Legal Concepts and Fulfilling of Legal Gaps, in Juri Lotman’s Semiotic Framework

The article examines whether the structure of meaning proposed in cultural semiotics by the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics is applicable for the interpretation of undefined legal concepts and to the filling of legal gaps. With the assistance of Lotman’s cultural semiotics, one is able to formulate the regularities that operate in legal interpretation in the same way as in culture. One of these is the binary structure of legal concepts and gaps. In interpreting norms and striving to overcome legal gaps, it is necessary to define the external reference (‘utterance’) and the self-reference (‘text’) in law. The article clarifies and examines these in the legal context and reiterates the value of bearing in mind throughout the process that interpretation always takes place in relation to this binary structure

Umberto Eco’s Theory of Interpretation as Textual Cooperation: Application to Legal Interpretation

German scholars make a distinction between the subjective theory of legal interpretation (to get to know the legislator's will) and the objective theory of legal interpretation (to get to know the meaning of law), used in combination in legal practice.81 When finding a place for Eco's theory between them, it should be emphasised that Eco's model analyses not the intentions of the author, but the directives of the text. Text as a generative scheme and a syntactic-semantic-pragmatic grasp82 of its internal structures determines its interpretation. Accordingly, the law directs its reader. The model Reader is thus inscribed in the text. As introduced in a practical way in the current article, at all levels of actualised content – discursive, narrative, actantial and ideological – the peculiarity of law text is that the Model Reader is helped to actualise the right structures, stimulated by the author (legislature). The reader's ability to recognise codes and subcodes, to actualise the narrative structures of fabula, topic and frames, and the capacity to recognise ideological structures is directed by the text at all levels. Knowing this, and keeping it in mind, helps lawyers to interpret laws with maximum adherence to the text. Therefore it is possible that, in parallel to traditional interpretative canons, lawyers to try to take into account Eco's schema, which reminds them of their duty to be led by the text. The central question for juridical interpretation – uniformity – is assured by the ability of a text to create its Model Reader's competence. This is why the outcome should be more in accordance with the rule of law. Legal interpretation is, as a practical matter, an act of power83 and therefore should not be totally unconstrained. Eco's semiotic theory reminds us that each norm, in a similar way to a sign, contains a set of instructions84 for interpretation. These aspects of cooperation between the author and the reader – textual strategy that leads to partnership between the reader and the author85– consolidate the rule of law in interpretation of law-texts, a key point made by Umberto Eco. Turning back to the starting point concentrating particularly on the research potential of law and literature, I agree with Dunlop, who has suggested that research ‘about’ law will inevitably address much bigger questions than research ‘in’ law.86 It may be that the strongest benefit of Eco's interpretive account is highlighting totally different aspects as juridical interpretative theory. Differentiating discursive, narrative, actantial and ideological levels in law and finding a set of instructions from each of these levels makes the peculiarities of legal texts evident. At the same time finding meaning in a text in methodologically different ways helps to broaden the view of lawyers and may therefore have a self-reflectory as well as educative effect